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Executive Summary 
 
Financial Reform to Date 
 
Our analysis of Korea's prospects leads us to believe that Korea will not be secure 
against future economic crisis without structural reform of finance, enterprise, and labor 
markets. This is a difficult task for any country. Success inevitably creates strong vested 
interests, deeply ingrained habits, and a tendency to seek salvation in the solutions of 
the past. Will Korea resist this temptation and undertake long-term structural reform? 
Under current conditions, we anticipate that:  
• Reform of the Korean finance system will stop at recapitalizing banks and solving 
bankruptcies.  
• Enterprise reform will not be sufficient to restrain family control over chaebols.  
• Korean labor reform will not proceed beyond the recent agreement to allow 
layoffs only with government approval.  
Given these anticipated levels of reform, the prospects for future sustained growth are 
fragile. 
 
An Alternative Approach 
 
Structural reforms must be built upon what is politically feasible. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) can work with key stakeholders, identify necessary tradeoffs, and 
promote broad social consensus so that the reforms are politically durable. To overcome 
the deadlock in Korea, we suggest as a solution that international financial institutions, 
the IMF and World Bank, facilitate a labor reform agreement between President Kim 
Dae-Jung and the chaebols that would allow a tradeoff of a more open labor market in 
exchange for opening the financial system. With the political capital gained through this 
reform, the government can go on to promote minority shareholder rights within 
chaebols. 
 
Structural reform in Korea has been slow because multilateral officials have not 
coordinated appropriate tradeoffs among politically significant stakeholders. As a result, 
the proposed reforms have not been not politically viable. Reform bargains need to 
overcome the divergent interests of key stakeholders. Without such coordination, reform 
is inherently unstable. For conditionality to be politically viable, it must be self-enforcing;
domestic political coalitions must view the reforms to be in their own interests, and they 
must be able to take ownership of those reforms. International financial organizations 
can help broker reforms, but successful implementation occurs at home. 
 
Introduction 
 
Korea's annual growth rate of 6.6 percent from 1960 to 1992 made it the best-
performing emerging market in the world. Such sustained performance required 
institutional and policy adaptability in response to changing global economic trends. 
 
However, many of the policies that helped jumpstart the economy in the past are 
irrelevant in today's global economic marketplace. The financial crisis of and since 1997 
is the most serious challenge to Korea's future prosperity since the Korean War. 
Surmounting the obstacles to future growth will depend on the country's resolve to 
undertake long-term structural reform. This is a difficult task for any country, as success 
inevitably creates strong vested interests, deeply ingrained habits, and a tendency to 
seek salvation in the solutions of the past. Will Korea resist this temptation and forge 
ahead with a new development strategy, opening the society and economy to 
entrepreneurial risk-taking and making the ordinary Korean an owner of capital? 
 
By diligently implementing macroeconomic austerity, Korea has inspired hope that it will 
be the first of the East Asian countries to recover from the financial crisis of late 1997. 
One year after austerity was introduced, the currency rebounded, the stock market 
doubled in value, and reserves were replenished. However, the strengthening of balance 
sheets will be temporary if the structural reforms needed to keep the problems from 
recurring encounter stiff resistance. Can emerging Asia's star performer overcome the 
hurdles to comprehensive institutional reform? Returning to the path of rapid sustained 
growth will require Korea to put aside differences and coordinate its divergent interests. 
As in the rest of Asia, politics remain the primary obstacle to economic reform in Korea.
 
Crisis and Opportunity 
 
Crisis brings opportunity for change when key groups realize that their survival is at risk.
The institutional reforms that turned England, France, and Japan into economic 
powerhouses all came out of crisis. In each case, the state's fiscal capacity had shrunk 
to a point where elites had to cooperate to restore basic governmental capacity so that 
they could compete over the future allocation of resources.1 
 
Korea's first generation of institutional reforms was similarly born. After General Park 
Chung Hee seized power in 1961, the threat of national disintegration induced the 
construction of new institutions. In order to overcome opposition from deeply 
entrenched vested interests, President Park built needed public support on the premise 
that benefits would be shared by all. Labor's cooperation was necessary to prompt 
business to invest in long-term plant facilities, since growth hobbled by social unrest 
could not be sustained. Shared growth became the strategy that allowed Park to prevail 
over the previously insurmountable mistrust between various divergent social interests.2 
To make his promise of shared growth credible, Park worked to eliminate endemic 
bureaucratic corruption and to provide broad-based access to basic health and 
education. By upholding standards of civil service integrity and not grabbing the profits 
of the private sector, Park demonstrated that his government could be a reliable partner 
in the development process. 3 Confidence in the regime's survival grew, which in turn 
prompted the private sector to invest in the long term. To outsiders it looked as if 
Koreans were standing shoulder-to-shoulder to work for a better future. 
 
The economic policies and practices that helped South Korea escape threats to its 
survival in the 1960s created interests that stand in the way of change today. They also 
created chronic internal weaknesses that cannot withstand global economic integration. 
For example, privileged access to government-subsidized credit is a vestige of a seized 
government/business interface that initially helped the government coordinate national 
resources to pursue long-term growth priorities. A highly supervised and centralized 
credit system that worked by fostering export contests was never fully transformed into 
a system of market-based financial discipline. Long before the financial system collapsed 
in December 1997, this underlying structural weakness already had been the subject of 
a government study released in 1993 showing that financial markets suffered from 
significant political interference on behalf of the chaebols and lacked the capacity for 
adequate prudential supervision.4 
 
Corporate governance was deeply flawed; with little accountability to minority 
shareholders or workers, conglomerates could migrate dangerously from their core 
competencies. Labor rigidity inhibited entrants into new product markets. However, 
Korea's outstanding growth figures led to procrastination. Reform was postponed: "Why 
change if we are doing so well?" 
 
Since the collapse of the Korean currency, the won, in November 1997, new voices 
promising dramatic reform have been heard from the center of government. Upon his 
election in December 1997, President Kim Dae-Jung outlined a new vision for Korea's 
future in which small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) would become the engines 
of growth and new employment, just as they had been in the United States. On a 
speaking tour in the United States, he advised investors that Korea had more to offer 
than just the country's well-known conglomerates. To restrain those conglomerates from 
dominating the economy, he promised to end "government-controlled economic growth 
that made it possible for the nation's economy to be controlled by the collusive link 
between politicians and businessmen and government influence over finance."5 
 
Foreign direct investment and enhanced opportunities for SMEs would be the two pillars 
of a new, more competitive economy. "Small enterprises are the most important in our 
time," President Kim told foreign journalists on May 30, 1997. "Small businesses are 
more suitable for today's demand for production of many items in small quantities, as 
opposed to the past demand for production of a few items in large quantities." 6 At the 
1998 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in Kuala Lumpur, Kim 
championed the cause of international economic integration through trade openness and 
financial liberalization. 
 
Nevertheless, fully one year after the initial agreement with the IMF, Korea's five largest 
conglomerates are stronger than ever within the Korean economy. They now dominate 
credit allocation, leaving little for their weaker partners. Domestic competition has 
decreased rather than increased. Indeed, opportunity has become further concentrated 
rather than diffused. Where 30 chaebols once reigned, just five now dominate, thus 
increasing each's leverage over the government. SMEs have been hit hardest in the 
economic shakedown; many have had to lay off staff and liquidate enterprises. How did 
the chaebols grow stronger under the nose of their historically strongest critic? 
 
Structural Weakness of Political Institutions 
Prevents Legislative Solution to Crisis 
 
Although President Kim consistently has advocated the parallel development of 
democracy and a market economy, Korea lacks the institutions for complex democratic 
politics and the vote trading necessary to promote and implement a policy dialogue 
about basic reforms. 
 
The legislature does not provide an arena for disputing parties to negotiate on important 
policy issues.7 The absence of appropriate interest-group intermediation holds back 
recovery by preventing consensus on the necessity for restoring economic well-being, 
namely, the recapitalization of South Korean banks. Kim will need taxpayer support for 
such a measure, but he has been reluctant to borrow the capital needed from citizens; 
he would have to explain where the money is going and how it is spent. A request for 
taxes could cost his presidential authority, which Kim does not want to risk. On this 
issue, he is supported by the chaebols.8 
 
Kim is reported to have said that "Asian-style democracy in which governments are built 
around a powerful leader who dictates economic policy is the fundamental cause of 
Asia's current financial crisis." 9 Consistent with his observation, Korea still does not 
possess an administrative apparatus to adequately defend the political rights of its 
citizens. Many of the existing institutions were derived from the period of martial law. 
For example, Korea's legislative authority is weak. The National Assembly is subordinate 
to the executive branch in policymaking. The courts and chief prosecutor have limited 
independence from the executive branch. Hence, laws can be enforced only if the 
president wants them to be enforced.10 
 
Without a strong legislature to provide a stable mechanism of interest intermediation, 
greater international donor pressure may be needed to settle a deal between state, 
labor, and business in Korea. 
 
The IMF Program 
 
Korea needed the IMF in late 1997 to avoid imminent default on its payments. Efforts to 
maintain the currency at pre-crisis levels vis-à-vis the dollar had depleted its reserves. 
 
Depreciation of the currency would have made it difficult to pay down dollar debt. In its 
analysis, the IMF articulated the importance of long-term structural reform to prevent 
recurrence of the crisis. Nevertheless, this message was overshadowed by the macro 
adjustments that led the IMF to release $21 billion. Though unusual for the IMF, its 
insistence on the primacy of long-term issues reflected a consensus that if Korea did not 
abandon "authoritarian developmentalism," the underdeployment of resources would 
make the economy vulnerable to crisis. 11 
 
Ironically, the most controversial part of the reform program, macroeconomic austerity, 
has been implemented, while the less-controversial microstructural reforms have lagged.
 
Many prominent economists have publicly criticized the IMF's commitment to austerity. 
In fact, the World Bank and the IMF have been feuding over the merits of austerity. 
 
Although there is much disagreement on macro adjustments, little disagreement exists 
over the structural reforms that the Korean economy needs. Almost everyone agrees 
that the conglomerates must focus on core specialties, that they must be subject to 
financial market discipline, that cheap credit for government favorites must end, and 
that a market for corporate control must be developed in order to hold management 
accountable to shareholders. 
 
Similarly, there is agreement that labor costs have escalated beyond productivity gains 
since 1987. Labor-market flexibility should approach the standards of Korea's 
competitors, especially if foreigners are to find ownership of Korean assets attractive. 
Yet, one year after the collapse of the currency, the banking system has not been 
recapitalized, numerous bankrupt businesses remain, excess capacity has yet be 
rationalized, and the labor market is still less flexible than that of Korea's industrial 
competitors. 
 
Why, then, has the usually controversial macroeconomic austerity package been so 
easily carried out? Macroeconomic reform programs, often overseen by a single ministry,
require little political consensus to implement. Structural change, by contrast, requires 
political consensus, which has been difficult to construct. While most Koreans agree on 
the necessity of reform to restore general well-being, the groups that have the most 
power to influence reform have no motivation to initiate changes that may challenge 
their positions in the long run. The top five chaebols and organized labor have felt very 
little of the pain and, in fact, have seen their power enhanced. Thus, these politically 
significant players are averse to change because it threatens their preferred political 
positions. 
 
Although President Kim claims broad support for reform, support fragments when each 
issue is separated. Koreans view chaebol labor and financial markets as part of an 
implicit social bargain in which chaebols receive public financial support in exchange for 
a commitment to labor stability. No one part of Korea's social contract can be separated 
from the other without rupturing the overall bargain. Since the key issues are 
interdependent, solving any one issue requires progress on the other: labor reform is 
needed for chaebol reform, financial sector reform is needed to reform the chaebol, 
chaebol reform creates flexible labor markets, and so forth. This triangle constitutes a 
package of agreed social responsibilities. As a result, a coordinated political deal is 
needed to restore consensus and overcome the stalemate. This deal must address all 
three pillars of Korea's authoritarian past: industrial concentration, labor security, and a 
centralized financial system. 
 
Economic Consequences of Anticipated 
Financial Market Reform: Will an 
Entrepreneurial Korea Be Born? 
 
Korea, Inc. discovered mercantilism at a time when its potential competitors in the Third 
World were discovering autarchy and import substitution. Few countries openly endorse 
import substitution today. The export-to-growth path is crowded with competitors. 
Recognizing that this blueprint for past success is no longer relevant, President Kim's 
vision for a new, competitive Korea is through diversification of ownership and capital. 
Instead of allowing a small group of companies to make all the decisions about 
production, Kim says he wants to end monopoly power. He hopes to promote 
diversification of ownership and knowledge in order to encourage the introduction of new
trades and industries. But what has happened to his resolve to implement the legal 
changes that will enable Koreans to unlock their entrepreneurial talents? Where are the 
innovations in financial arrangements that will allow citizens to take risks and discover 
new paths toward prosperity? 
 
In order to anticipate the prospects for reform, Milken Institute staff and consultants 
surveyed experts within Korea to identify the key stakeholders, their ability to influence 
the reform process, their stated positions, and the importance or salience of each issue 
to them. The goal was to define the necessary policy steps toward achieving deep 
financial, enterprise, and labor reform. Our analysis identifies which political coalitions 
support what levels of reform, as well as which reform steps are politically feasible. This 
approach also identifies the set and sequence of economic reform steps that can be 
currently implemented as well as the most effective strategy to achieve them.12 
 
Financial System Reform 
 
Problem: The financial system is an ineffective intermediary between savers and 
investors. Too few actors have incentives to collect information to make financial 
markets function effectively; thus, existing financial institutions do not effectively match 
capital with profitable investment opportunities. 
 
Causes: The financial sector has not evolved in tandem with an increasingly 
sophisticated private sector; it has become dysfunctional and vestigial. In the 1960s, a 
centralized financial sector funded a mercantilist offensive by allowing government to 
direct credit to companies that exported successfully. An export yardstick provided a 
market-based criterion for credit allocation. In the 1980s, the government withdrew its 
direct control. It continued to indirectly approve credit allocation, but it could no longer 
track how much was borrowed. Nevertheless, the government was responsible for 
implicitly funding the banking system, leaving considerable margin for abuse. The banks 
could borrow overseas and, although the debt was implicitly backed by the government, 
government supervision was weak. At the same time, lenders believed the government 
was committed to maintaining its currency and had the means to do so. Long-standing 
exchange-rate pegs encouraged financial institutions to borrow abroad, convert the 
borrowed funds into domestic currency, and then lend domestically. International 
investors did not think they had to worry since their investments were brokered by local 
banks that were presumed to have government backing. Meanwhile, Korean 
intermediaries had little motive to develop the necessary skills in credit analysis, as they 
believed their loans were backed by the government. 
 
The banks never acquired an adequate supervisory framework for another reason: The 
government insured the financing requirements of the conglomerates and implicitly 
underwrote their risks. Since the banks did not choose projects nor make decisions 
about which firms should expand, they did little monitoring. They provided finance 
essentially at the direction of state planners. But neither the planners nor the banks had 
an incentive to independently assess the plans they were financing and, as a result, did 
not acquire the skills necessary for effective loan assessment. For example, the banks 
continued to funnel capital into industries that already exhibited significant overcapacity 
and declining profits. Then bankers, gambling on resurrection, extended credit to 
insolvent firms to keep from going under themselves. 
 
Without appropriate accounting, would-be bank regulators could not regulate the banks, 
which in turn could not regulate the borrowers. The government was unaware of how 
much borrowing occurred offshore and did not have realistic estimates of debt-equity 
ratios. It seems they were not able even to count the number of subsidiaries belonging 
to each chaebol group. The absence of fundamental information did not seem to matter. 
Credit was allocated on the basis of personal relationships or collateral. The largest 
borrowers got the rosiest assessments, since it was understood that they could always 
borrow more to pay off existing debts. So long as the economy grew, the potential of 
the chaebols was considered unlimited. This general lack of oversight and transparency 
served the interests of the large industrial interest groups that dominated Korean 
society. By providing policy loans, the government had in effect exempted firms from 
bearing the risk of investment. 
 
The massive quantity of nonperforming loans was actually a by-product of government 
policy that allowed a small group of financially unfit companies to defy the laws of profit 
maximization. The reforms necessary to exit this impasse now threaten the interests of 
the state. The clout of these companies is derived from the failure of the government to 
provide a regulatory framework from which a commercially oriented banking system 
could emerge. In effect, both the banks and the government have been captured by the 
very industrial concerns that they created. 
 
Solutions: The first matter of business is to clean up nonperforming loans. In 1998, the 
government set up a vehicle for acquiring nonperforming loans: the Korea Asset 
Management Corporation (KAMCO). Reformers believe this is only the first step, 
although conservatives like to view it as sufficient to restore the financial well-being of 
the country. Real reform requires a transfer of the skills and information necessary for 
running the financial system from the government to market-based institutions, forcing 
domestic banks to take full responsibility for the loans they authorize. 
 
Progress in the financial sector is a prerequisite for restructuring the enterprise sector. 
The erosion of profit margins, low return on equity, and low return on capital all reflect a 
lack of financial discipline. Banks must be able to allocate credit on the basis of an 
objective assessment of a borrower's cash flow prospects. 13 Korea is chided for failing to
establish accounting standards, which are considered a precondition for effective bank 
regulation. Active credit analysis, however, will thrive when loans are resold, which 
means that alternatives to banks must be developed. Greater independence for the 
central bank's inspection of the financial sector will ensure that these standards, once 
introduced, are maintained. 
 
The Politics of Financial Reform 
 
The IMF and World Bank recognize that extensive banking and credit reforms are a 
necessary part of the Korean economic recovery. Although there is political consensus 
within Korea for general financial sector reform, there is no agreement on the extent of 
desired reforms. Figure 1 shows the policy steps necessary for financial system reform 
and the divisions among the preferences of key actors. 
 
 
 
The final step in the reform process would align Korean banks with Western institutions, 
while the first step represents Korean banking policies at the onset of the current 
economic crisis. Koreans recognize the need to solve the nonperforming loan problem 
and recapitalize their banks. In this regard, solving the current loan problems is only the 
first step; decentralizing financial decisions through institutional reform is essential. Our 
analysis strongly indicates that discussions on financial reform are polarized. Each 
coalition is committed to a different step in the process. The IMF and World Bank 
advocate deep reforms; the chaebols see the problem simply as a liquidity issue, while 
President Kim adopts the intermediate step of moderate institutional reforms. The 
parties have not been willing to compromise. 
 
Believing that the path to prosperity includes financial reforms, President Kim currently 
is willing to take steps toward a competitive financial system, including the promotion of 
open bond, equity, and insurance markets and a Western-style investment banking 
structure. The majority of Koreans support moderate financial reform as well. 
Presidential allies include the Korean academic community, the Financial Supervisory 
Committee, the Ministry of Finance and Economics, the banking sector, the media, the 
National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) ruling party, the United Liberal Democrats 
(ULD) coalition party, and the Grand National Party (GNP) opposition party. 
 
Despite such support, Kim will be unable to force the chaebols or the IMF and World 
Bank to agree with his proposals. Indeed, he faces political pressures from two opposite 
sides. The chaebols want to solve the liquidity problem and revert to the pre-crisis 
financial system while the IMF, World Bank, and Korean technocrats support deep 
institutional reforms. Despite a broad-based consensus for needed change, the chaebols 
are poised to persuade their traditional allies to thwart presidential calls for reform and 
to oppose IMF and World Bank demands for dramatic change, thus maintaining a 
deadlock on banking reform. The longer reform fails, the more dissent will grow. 
Delaying reform entrenches positions on all sides, decreasing societal support for any 
reform. 
 
Breaking Up the Credit Oligarchy is the Key to Financial Market 
Reform 
 
Extensive financial market development is necessary to correct the underemployment of 
capital. Although most Koreans support the institutional reforms needed to create a 
competitive financial system, the chaebols and conservative political parties in Korea 
advocate only recapitalizing banks, expressing hostility to foreign ownership of troubled 
financial institutions. 
 
Korea is constantly chastised for not attaining universal standards of accounting. The 
IMF position on banking reform placed heavy emphasis on overcoming the chronic 
problem of poor accounting by mandating international accounting standards through 
legislation and governmental audits. The assumption that active monitoring is a product 
of legislation is a frequent misconception of the international donor approach. 
Experience outside of Korea suggests that active credit analysis is a by-product of an 
active market for loans. 
 
When a few banks dominate the loan market, as in Korea, they have little incentive to 
invest in developing the skills of active credit analysis. Banks became specialized in 
catering to the particular needs of the companies they financed because the government 
mandated that they focus on particularly narrow segments of the economy. An oligarchic 
credit system thrives on protecting special information about the markets, structures, 
and performance of its clients. Making that information easily available allows rivals to 
use the information to expand their own businesses. In addition, greater public 
disclosure risks exposing information about possible nonperforming assets. Why risk 
kindling doubts about the solvency of established financial institutions and their clients? 
 
Not surprisingly, the major banks in Korea have used their control over information to 
control the loan market. An active assessment of loan performance may threaten their 
ability to continue controlling the loan supply. Recapitalizing the banking sector as it 
existed will allow large financial institutions to continue to dominate the credit market—
the very organizations that have no incentive to actively monitor their loans. 
 
Requiring regulatory disclosure through legislation supported by technical assistance will 
never be as effective as liberalization. Only if direct political interference and the danger 
of confiscation is eliminated will companies seeking credit want to disclose convincingly. 
Then the skills of credit analysis will migrate to their higher-value users—the companies 
that buy and sell loans—and they will therefore have an interest in active assessments 
of loan performance. 
 
Thus, active credit assessment will come with an active market for loans. Transparency, 
improved corporate accountability, and governance all facilitate proper risk pricing via 
the transmission of market signals and emerge along with rating agencies and credit 
analysis when institutional investors and issuers freely seek each other. Regulatory 
review, creditors' rights, and covenant structures are all products of economic 
competition that come into being as the government steps out of the direct management
of credit allocation. Breaking up the monopoly of a few large lenders will do more to 
develop credit analysis than trying to regulate it into existence. Bringing foreign banks 
into the Korean market will be an important step in this direction. 
 
Enterprise Reform 
 
Problem: The weakness of financial-market supervision promoted unhealthy industrial 
development. Since the government stepped in to prevent large firms from going under, 
they became "too large to fail," further consolidating their grip on credit. This paved the 
way for their almost unlimited expansion into unrelated businesses. First, the 
government conferred preferential status to industries by relieving them from 
competitive pressures. Then it allowed the firms to expand into areas in which they had 
no competitive advantage through the practice of cross-guarantees within chaebols. 
Internal cross-financing made it possible for chaebols to grow in seeming defiance of 
market forces. Although expansion started with government support of preferred 
sectors, firms soon moved into unrelated sectors, using finance derived from the core 
specialty; electronics manufacturers, for example, eventually came to own hotels and 
golf courses and a host of other subsidiaries. Figures 2 and 3 show both the number and 
relevance to core businesses of these new subsidiaries, while Table 1 shows the fiscal 
results of these holdings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transfer pricing within a conglomerate allows one subsidiary to subsidize another, 
thereby allowing unprofitable subsidiaries to operate. It also prevents SMEs from 
operating in areas where chaebols are not efficient. Many conglomerates were dragged 
down by their affiliates. For example, Kia Motors, despite having world-class production 
facilities, was dragged down by its failing sister companies: Specialty Steel, Asia Motors, 
and Kaisan. 
 
The balance between large and small businesses became disproportionately weighted 
toward the large firms to the point where they could dump their problems into the laps 
of smaller enterprises. Chaebols were known to force the acceptance of promissory 
notes with unfavorable terms on smaller firms. They could pressure those firms to cut 
prices on products they sold to their big brothers. Eventually, many were driven out of 
their specialized niches. Thus President Kim has asserted that "if chaebols restructure, it 
will create competitiveness for companies and more jobs for workers." 14 
 
Solutions: Chaebol reform should include restricting the practice of cross-guaranteeing 
loans and cross-shareholding in order to trim their lines of business to core specialties. 
The rights of small shareholders need protection. The boards of directors and auditors 
should be given meaningful, independent roles. Management should be disciplined by an 
active market for mergers and acquisitions. Financial institutions must play an active 
role as investors. In the long run, the government must shed its habit of allocating 
resources by decree and instead set up fair competition laws to break the collusion of 
business and politics. Once a culture develops where individual Koreans own shares and 
demand a return on the capital, business accounting practices will fall into line with 
international accounting standards. 
 
The Politics of Enterprise Reform 
 
Chaebol reform addresses the very foundation of Korea's corporatist society. President 
Kim clearly has stated that the future of Korea is tied to the development of SMEs and 
has attempted to reduce chaebol overcapacity through legislation. The policy steps 
toward enterprise reform are depicted in Figure 4. 
 
 
The final step toward real reform would require chaebol owners to accept diversified 
ownership structures with management-sharing concessions, voting rights, and 
corporate transparency. This is a far cry from the current, almost unimpeded control 
over business and resources that chaebol owners enjoy. Koreans disagree strongly on 
the economic and political feasibility of chaebol reform. Labor, technocrats, and the 
NCNP demand a diversified management and ownership structure with voting rights. 
President Kim, supported by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), IMF, and World Bank, 
advocates that ownership reform be limited to ending internal cross-guarantees with 
some management sharing and diversified ownership. However, the ULD and GNP do 
not support such reforms, and instead advocate less-extensive changes that focus only 
on diversifying ownership and consolidating assets. Under pressure from labor, Kim has 
advocated far more extensive reforms than his traditional political constituency is willing 
to accept. However, many Koreans fear that tampering with the chaebols through 
ownership reform risks killing the geese that lay the golden eggs. 
 
The "Big 5" chaebols—Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, LG, and SK—prefer to legalize 
holding companies but would be willing to consolidate around core competencies while 
maintaining all management control. The president, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economics, and the president's Blue House bureaucrats want to pressure the Big 5 
chaebols to make further concessions. In reaction to this pressure, the chaebols might 
accept the third step of diversified ownership reforms without management sharing as 
token concessions to be made over time. However, such changes fall far short of the 
demands for significant reforms by President Kim, the IMF, and the World Bank. 
Currently, political support for chaebol reform is low and likely will decrease if the 
chaebols accept only minimal reforms. By paying more attention to chaebol reform, the 
FTC along with the GNP and ULD could prompt the chaebols into accepting this deal at 
an earlier time. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the outlines of a possible policy compromise that would result if the 
chaebols moved up one step in the reform process while labor, Korean technocrats, and 
the NCNP moved down one step. 
 
 
The Economic Implications of Enterprise Reform 
 
The chaebols no longer can defy the financial laws of gravity; systemic corporate 
restructuring is necessary. Effective equity markets will not form until chaebols can be 
broken up into units whereby economic performance can be more directly observed. In 
their present formulation, chaebol components cannot be assessed according to the 
criteria set for a normal economic rate of return and shareholder value. Developing 
efficient equity and bond markets would require diversification of chaebol ownership and 
the establishment of minority shareholder rights. 
 
However, given entrenched chaebol interests and their traditional political power, only 
minimal reforms, including the legitimization of holding companies and some expansion 
of ownership possibilities is likely through voluntary restructuring. 
 
Initially, the Big 5 chaebols, responsible for 32 percent of corporate sales in 1997, had 
the opportunity to restructure themselves. They first agreed to halve the number of their
subsidiaries, then use the proceeds to pay off existing debts. Next, the government 
demanded that the chaebols end their cross-subsidiary loan guarantees and prepare 
consolidated financial statements. The government also emphasized that it would 
penalize intragroup trading. When it was clear the chaebols were not responding to the 
government's insistence that all payment guarantees across different affiliates in 
different industries end by 1998, the Blue House stiffened its resolve. Thirty-five years 
ago, General Park rounded up the chaebol leaders and threw them in jail until they 
complied with national development goals. This time, President Kim can do no more 
than insist that financial institutions limit their bond holdings to any one chaebol at a 
maximum of 15 percent of their portfolio. This did not move chaebol reform far forward 
on the scale of ownership transparency and management accountability, the key issues. 
Moreover, the chaebols can evade the regulations, for example, by establishing ghost 
companies overseas. 
 
Koreans view the government-chaebol agreement on voluntary restructuring, called the 
"Big Deal," as a significant step toward industrial consolidation. It is premised on the 
belief that consolidation around core competencies will eliminate the danger to otherwise
healthy companies of being brought down by their nonperforming assets. But what is 
accomplished when Daewoo, already debt-ridden, acquires Sangyong Motors, or when 
overleveraged Hyundai acquires the debts of Kia Motors? The larger companies created 
are no more efficient than the ones they replaced; losing companies are not shut down, 
and excess capacity persists. 
 
In the first year, the restructuring plan focused on the development of a time frame and 
on the specific affiliates to be spun off. However, this simply allows the conglomerates to 
dump on the public assets that are unsalvageable and keep the jewels for themselves. 
Under the new reform, the chaebols are consolidating value for themselves at the 
public's expense. Moreover, the Big Deal does not replace the need for effective market 
discipline that comes when capital markets reward effective corporate strategies with 
investor capital. The Big Deal is trying to replace the market with government. This 
might have made sense when the private sector was weak and lacked experience, but it 
makes no sense now in an era when the private sector is more knowledgeable than the 
government. 
 
Labor Reform 
 
Problem: Labor-market rigidity weakens the competitive position of Korean industry. 
Companies cannot adjust to business cycles and are forced to accept high costs of 
maintaining labor during recessions, making economic cycles more extreme than they 
need to be. 
 
Korean assets have been unattractive to foreign investors. Foreign merger and 
acquisition specialists report that bankrupt companies may need to lay off as many as 
one-third of their employees before multinational companies will consider investing. 
Although the government enacted new laws in early 1997 to increase labor-market 
flexibility, it refused to allow Hyundai to use them to lay off 8,000 workers. A 
contentious strike ensued, forcing President Kim to intervene. Foreign confidence in 
labor reform sank when only several hundred workers were let go. 
 
Causes: Directed and financed by cheap government credit, the chaebols subsidized 
social stability during economic downturns by keeping their employees and thousands of 
subsuppliers working. In return, the government furnished the conglomerates with a 
compliant labor force. This job security arrangement, coupled with an economy that 
historically has had low levels of unemployment, prevented the development of a flexible
labor market. 
 
Solution: To gain support for improved labor-market flexibility, the government needs to 
introduce a national safety net that includes those not presently covered and that 
extends benefits for those who are cut off after a short period. Clear and credible rules 
governing layoffs are crucial to bolstering foreign direct investment, particularly among 
bankrupt companies where redundancies are likely to be the highest. 
 
Properly structured equity arrangements provide management with direct incentives to 
run companies more efficiently. Regulations allowing Korean companies to use equity 
ownership, particularly employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and stock options, offer 
management alternatives to cash to motivating employees. Moreover, investors prefer 
companies with high management-ownership ratios. Increased equity incentives also will 
help to unlock Korea's highly developed human capital. 
 
The Politics of Labor Reform 
 
In 1998, the Korean government took taken the first policy step toward labor reform by 
allowing temporary layoffs of permanent employees among firms that have obtained 
government approval. Since Korea has no national unemployment insurance system, 
labor opposes unrestricted layoffs, relying on the president's commitment to overseeing 
them. Layoff reform faces stiff impediments. As business and labor interests clash, most 
Korean political and social groups recognize the difficulty in initiating substantive labor 
reform. Moderate labor groups (such as the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, or 
FKTU), government bureaucrats, the Ministry of Labor, and most political parties 
recognize the need for some mechanism to expand layoffs without provoking a political 
backlash. However, temporary or permanent layoffs are acceptable to the majority of 
Koreans only if the government maintains control over which employees and sectors are 
affected. Radical labor groups (such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, or 
KCTU) will continue to push for the old system of implicit lifetime employment, and 
President Kim will continue to advocate government control over layoffs to retain 
domestic political support. 
 
The IMF, World Bank, and chaebols all advocate real labor market reform, making 
strange bedfellows indeed. They would like to see an unrestricted and flexible labor 
market similar to Western standards. However, the IMF and World Bank refrain from 
pushing for significant labor reform because they recognize the domestic political 
pressures. They fear that protests targeted at reforms suggested by them could 
exacerbate the situation. In addition, labor reform is not the IMF's or the World Bank's 
highest priority. Under current conditions, these institutions are expected to do little 
more than observe the (minimal) progress between business and labor. By contrast, the 
chaebols' stake in labor reform is much greater and hence they will continue to pursue a 
flexible labor market. 
 
Figure 6 suggests that most Koreans believe that a flexible labor market could expose 
the nation to social upheaval; labor unions are able to play on their fear of the social 
consequences of unemployment. Consequently, when strikes and protests do occur, 
President Kim is expected to make political concessions to soften radical labor demands 
and appease moderates. While there is no returning to "lifetime employment" of the 
past labor reform seems likely to remain limited to temporary layoffs under government 
supervision. Such a policy generates moderate societal support, but is likely to increase 
over time. 
 
 
Although outcomes we anticipate based on current conditions indicate little real reform 
in Korea, several reform opportunities do exist. If the conservative parties (GNP and 
ULD) were to politicize the labor issue in the media by claiming that the president was 
prisoner to labor interests, they might be able to pressure labor to allow some 
permanent layoffs. Even so, substantive changes are not likely. 
 
The Economic Implications of Labor Reform 
 
Labor is unwilling to make any significant concessions. Only temporary layoffs can 
occur—and these only with government approval. Korean labor markets are less flexible 
at this level than those of their international competitors, making Korean assets 
unappealing to foreigners who do not have access to the subsidized credits of Korean 
owners. However, labor is willing to trade employment security for management and 
decision-making participation. Consequently, chaebol reform is closely connected to 
labor reform. Labor reform is potentially politically volatile. The government is thus 
unwilling to attempt it unless it can also help labor achieve some of its goals, namely 
opening the management system of the chaebols and establishing minority 
shareholding. Hence, barring unforeseen events, the prognosis is for stagnation on this 
critical front. Yet, as the following section shows, labor reform has the capacity to 
expand the entire reform process. 
 
An IMF/World Bank Grand Reform Bargain 
 
Our study has revealed that the IMF and World Bank have not fully realized their 
potential to contribute constructively to substantive labor reform. An approach that links 
labor, banking, and chaebol reform under IMF and World Bank leadership could lead to 
the following outcomes:  
• A more flexible contract-labor market that labor will support  
• A competitive financial system that a majority of Koreans will support  
• Diversified chaebol ownership with management sharing and minority 
shareholder rights  
We believe international donors have underestimated their ability to broker a broad-
based structural reform deal that would (a) be politically feasible and (b) enhance the 
openness of the economy. By supporting President Kim's proposals, the IMF and World 
Bank can bolster the reform process. A strengthened president could then push the 
major parties to collectively bargain on chaebol, bank, and labor reforms. Each party 
would gain on the issues that are important to each while conceding others in a package 
deal that would allow for a higher level of liberalization than has been attained so far. A 
key to striking such a deal is to identify what is politically acceptable in Korea. 15 
 
The IMF and World Bank can be effective brokers for structural changes in the Korean 
economy by becoming involved in all three dimensions of reform. While labor supports 
the IMF and World Bank on chaebol ownership reform, labor opposes their calls for a 
flexible labor market. Nevertheless, the chaebols agree with the IMF/World Bank 
position of creating a flexible labor force in Korea and oppose their position of 
diversifying ownership and management sharing. Meanwhile, President Kim is seeking a 
political consensus for levels of reform not far from IMF/World Bank objectives. Aligning 
these interests on banking and labor reform creates a window of opportunity to generate 
an effective bargain, while effecting more substantive chaebol reform. 
 
As Figure 7 shows, the IMF and World Bank side with the chaebols on layoffs and with 
Kim on banking. On policy steps of labor-market reform, both the chaebols and the IMF 
and World Bank advocate a flexible labor market. On the policy steps of financial system 
reform, Kim and the IMF and World Bank are calling for institutional reform. 
 
An IMF/World Bank-brokered deal between the chaebols and the president could break 
the present stalemate by linking labor and banking reforms. In order to gain the 
economic advantages of a more flexible labor market, the chaebols may be willing to 
make concessions on financial reform. Likewise, Kim can offer labor flexibility in return 
for financial-sector reform. The outcome of this agreement can result in the promotion 
of open bond, equity, and insurance markets, coupled with the emergence of a contract 
labor market that allows some permanent layoffs. 
 
Such a brokered deal would require the president, IMF, World Bank, and chaebols to 
build domestic support in order to avoid opposition from labor. Once a deal between the 
president and chaebols was struck, labor might well allow progressive reform toward the 
creation of a contract labor market rather than risk losing further societal support as the 
public realizes how entrenched labor interests impede Korea's economic future. 
Moreover, in contrast to the pattern of past secret agreements, this new style of social 
engagement would entail openness and the building of a broad social agreement. 
 
 
Successful banking and labor reform would have a second important payoff: It would 
strengthen support for Kim's enterprise reform initiative, opening an opportunity to 
achieve substantial change. Striking a deal on financial system reform and labor reform 
would create the necessary political capital for the forces of reform. Kim, with the help of
IMF and World Bank, would then implement enterprise reform, encompassing 
management sharing, meaningful minority rights, and management accountability. 
 
In this scenario, the level of management sharing would be far above what was 
previously acceptable to the chaebols. Moreover, by allowing some labor participation in 
the management process, a broad-based societal consensus can be created. 
 
The IMF/World Bank directive we recommend above would achieve:  
• a labor market moving toward flexible contract labor,  
• a competitive financial system, and  
• a diversified chaebol ownership structure with management sharing  
Such a comprehensive brokered package of measures would not give Korea the 
openness and flexibility of a Western economy, but it would produce a durable 
foundation for economic competitiveness and dynamism for political cohesion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Korean society has changed dramatically since General Park became president in 1962 
of a country in ruin: North Korea, backed by China, then possessed much of the 
peninsula's industrial capacity. The United States had lost faith in the ability of South 
Korea to govern itself and had just withdrawn economic support. With this formidable 
threat at their door and no one on which to rely for future security, Koreans put their 
differences aside to accept institutional reforms that would allow Park to "modernize the 
fatherland." Park's campaign to modernize was fueled by the urgency of pulling together 
a country at war. Individuals were expected to put aside private advantages to prevent 
mutual destruction. 
 
The financial crisis that broke out in December 1997 is the most serious threat to 
Korea's future survival since the 1960s. When the government, on the verge of 
defaulting on its international payments, turned to the IMF for relief, the crisis affected 
every social interest in the country. The IMF wisely saw an opportunity to draw attention 
to the need for fundamental institutional reform to help Korea withstand future regional 
downturns. However, the breathing space the IMF provided unwittingly altered the 
incentives of different groups to cooperate in preventing future crises. 
 
The IMF assumed that, once out of the danger zone, the country would focus on what 
went wrong and the president would have time to build support for reforms. After the 
agreements were signed, President Kim confidently asserted that "we have become 
keenly aware of the consequences of not adjusting to exchanges in the world and of 
losing competitiveness." 16 In fact, the opposite occurred: Support for Kim's reforms 
weakened. The five largest chaebols defiantly went to the international credit market to 
secure more loans for more acquisitions. They had to be coerced to comply with what 
was initially intended to be voluntary restructuring. The liberalization program set forth 
in the IMF accord is on a much grander scale than any political group in Korea would find
acceptable. If he attempted to introduce such radical reforms, Kim would risk 
destabilizing his political base, which even for a proponent is a highly unrealistic 
expectation. Essential to crafting a stable reform bargain is to build upon what is feasible
by discovering where support for reform rests. Here the IMF proposals were lacking. 
 
The hopes of the IMF and World Bank to reform Korea's basic economic institutions were 
based on the notion that the interests of the government parallel those of the governed. 
Motivated to revitalize his economy, Kim, it was presumed, would do what informed 
opinion deemed the best overall bet for the country's future. This approach to economic 
policy reform assumed the task was a matter of identifying the best possible program 
and then coordinating national resources to achieve that result: i.e., place the right 
experts in the right positions and the rest would be easy. World Bank President James 
Wolfensohn assured investors, "Korea has a first-class team which understands what's 
going on and it's going in the right direction."17 However, experts in Korea had been 
trying to get the government's attention about the weakness of financial institutions for 
some time. Even before the crisis the right people were in the right places, but to no 
avail. The politicians were not listening—and not because they did not understand. 
 
Much can be learned about the role of crisis in generating support for lasting reforms 
from Korea's experience. IMF officials did not prepare themselves with appropriate 
knowledge about what was politically feasible before going into negotiations, and then 
relied too much on declarations of good will expressed by the president and his 
technocratic advisers. They did not recognize that the positions they advocated lay 
outside of what was acceptable to any single group other than internationally trained 
economists, and therefore took a position potentially harmful to the president. They also 
failed to see the interconnectedness of the issues with which they were dealing, ignoring 
the importance of labor reform for gaining support for financial-market liberalization. 
 
It is now apparent that division of labor among the multilateral players can be an 
obstacle to implementing comprehensive reforms. The IMF gave up its leverage by 
leaving the details to be worked out by the World Bank. Once the bailout funds were 
dispersed, however, the World Bank had little leverage. Its one tool was intellectual 
persuasion. To break the deadlock, World Bank officials must be able to offer some 
guidance to help politicians gain political support by advocating comprehensive reform. 
 
Crisis can bring change when the interests of key players are at stake. In Korea's case, 
once the country had been rescued from immediate disaster, the groups that the 
president depended on to stay in office had little to gain and much to lose from radical 
change. Although these influential groups represent a minority of Koreans, Korean civil 
society is still relatively undeveloped. Political parties are weak and are organized 
around regions and personalities rather than issues. Hence political authority is highly 
dependent on a few well-organized interest groups. These groups were in many cases 
stronger after the crisis than before. 
 
If a single universal message stands out from Korea's experience of the currency 
meltdown, it is that, before the bailout, the overall condition of the economy was 
everybody's concern. After the bailout, each group could again concentrate on its own 
affairs, ignoring the plight of the nation. 
 
Recovery without comprehensive reform is unlikely to be politically secure or socially 
durable. Although partial reform has opened the country to greater foreign ownership, it 
also makes the country ripe for future discord and social conflict. Labor has not gained 
management reform; the industrial empires still have a politically driven credit system 
to exploit. The few winners now own more of what is profitable, and are discarding loss-
making activities on the public. If the costs of restructuring are not borne evenly, a 
populist backlash remains a distinct possibility, making today's foreign investment a 
target for tomorrow's unrest. 
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